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Abstract
There is a tendency in the new institutionalist literature to equate institutional
inertia with stasis and ’no-change’. Using case studies from the international
telecommunications regime and the German health care system, the paper tries
to show that this equation is wrong. Inertia does not necessarily prevent institu-
tional change. It can interfere with the replacement of old institutions, but it
is compatible with other forms of institutional transformation. Inert structures
can be patched up with new structures or transposed to new functions. The
paper analyzes patching up and transposition as distinct modes of institutional
change and assesses their potential for adapting institutional arrangements to
new environmental conditions. It concludes that inertia should not be contrasted
with institutional change per se because inertia allows for and may even be
a prerequisite of change.
* * * * *
In der neo-institutionalistischen Literatur wird die Stabilität von Institutionen
oft mit der Abwesenheit jeglicher Art von institutionellem Wandel, mit Stasis,
gleichgesetzt. Zwei Fallstudien über das internationale Telekommunikations-
regime und das deutsche Gesundheitssystem zeigen, daß diese Gleichsetzung
falsch ist. Institutionelle Stabilität schließt institutionellen Wandel nicht generell
aus. Zwar erschwert sie Änderungen auf dem Wege radikaler Strukturumbau-
ten, erlaubt aber, etablierte Strukturen in neue Aufgabenfelder zu transferieren
oder durch zusätzliche Anbauten aufzurüsten. Das Papier untersucht den Anbau
neuer und den Transfer alter Strukturen als eigene Formen institutionellen
Wandels und analysiert deren Folgen für die Adaptivität institutioneller Struk-
turen. Fazit: Stabilität und Wandel sollten nicht grundsätzlich als Gegensätze
betrachtet werden, denn oft ist das eine Voraussetzung des anderen.
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1 Introduction
In recent research it has become common to denounce institutions for their
inertia. Institutions, the argument goes, enhance static efficiency but reduce
dynamic efficiency, they help actors deal with given problems but make it
difficult for them to adjust to new ones, they facilitate coordination but compli-
cate adaptation. This view is popular in sociology (e.g. Hannan/ Freeman 1977;
1984) and economics (e.g. North 1990) and is constitutive for large parts of the
New Institutionalism in political science (e.g. Skowronek 1982; Krasner 1988;
March/Olsen 1989)1. Many ’new institutionalists’ take it as a matter of faith
that the efficiency of institutions declines over time. They are all concerned
about how institutions create order, how the increasing returns to order induce
institutional inertia, and how institutional inertia produces an ever increasing
mismatch with the environment. Their favorite cases testify of institutions out-
living their initial conditions, their founders, and eventually their usefulness.
With the passage of time all institutional virtues seem to turn into vices2.
This notion has met with some criticism lately. Nobody disputes that institu-
tional inertia can prevent the effective adaptation to new environmental condi-
tions – the fate of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe is a vivid example –
but some scholars argue that it does not always do so. They criticize the New
Institutionalism’s "crypto-deterministic" (Mayntz/ Scharpf 1995: 9) assumptions
about the extent to which political outcomes are determined by institutional
structure, and they contend that even in the context of stable structures actors
often enjoy considerable leeway. Institutions may be rigid and unresponsive,
but they normally leave some room for policy change and adaptation (Thelen/
Steinmo 1992: 18).
However, even if institutions do not tie actors into straightjackets, institutional
inertia may still be a threat to adaptation. It restricts policy change to the op-
tions granted by prevailing structures. If there are no effective options in the
institutionally defined feasible set, adaptation is impossible without institutional
1 See also the review articles by Cammack (1992), and Thelen/ Steinmo (1992) and
the references therein.
2 This notion is reflected in statements like, for example, "institutions and pro-
cedures once created to serve socioeconomic development now appeared as self-
perpetuating perversions of that purpose" (Skowronek 1982: 40). Paul Cammack
concludes that in general "new institutionalists are concerned with disparities
between environmental and institutional change ... They address the tendency
for the efficiency of institutions to decline over time, and explore the conse-
quences" (Cammack 1992: 401).
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change. Hence, the important question becomes whether institutional inertia
actually prevents institutional change.
The New Institutionalists assert most emphatically that it does. According to
them, inertia is synonymous with ’no-change’. Change, in this perspective,
requires a radical break with the past, abandoning old routines, removing out-
moded institutions, and switching over to new structures. It is premised on
destruction, and unobtainable unless inertia can be overcome. History appears
as a succession of alternating phases of inertia and change. Normal history is
described as being governed by inertia. Institutions are relatively stable and
invariant. They pattern politics and political outcomes. All neo-institutionalist
arguments apply. Interspersed in normal history are episodes of crisis and
drama, where some environmental shock temporarily overpowers inertia and
institutional persistence. For a short moment in history the logic of the game
switches from "’Institutions shape politics’ to ’Politics shape institutions’" (The-
len/ Steinmo 1992: 15). Major institutional change becomes possible. Once the
moment is over, however, inertia reigns supreme again and conserves whatever
institutional change was made until the next crisis comes.3
The most sophisticated recent elaboration of the concept of discontinuous insti-
tutional change was provided by Stephen Krasner (1984; 1988), who draws an
analogy with the ’punctuated equilibrium’ model from evolutionary biology.
Structure, according to this model, is "primary and constraining, with change
as a ’difficult’ phenomenon, usually accomplished rapidly when a stable struc-
ture is stressed beyond its buffering capacity to resist and absorb" (Gould 1982:
383). Change is the exception rather than the rule, but once it occurs it is likely
to be radical and disruptive. The imagery is one of critical junctures connecting
long stretches of institutional continuity.4
3 To be sure, some scholars have dealt with non-disruptive institutional change.
But the thrust of their argument has typically been that this kind of change is
fairly ineffective in terms of adaptation. James March and Johan Olsen write,
for example, "[t]he political institutions we have described ... allow for incremen-
tal drift, but they constrain incrementalism in a way that tends to produce rela-
tively long periods of considerable stability punctuated by rather substantial,
rather abrupt changes" (March/ Olsen 1989: 170).
4 For the punctuated equilibrium concept see Gould (1982). The fundamental
assumptions of Krasner’s model are implicit in the many empirical case studies
of the ’reform necessary but not forthcoming’ type (e.g. Skowronek 1982) or the
’different countries, same pressures, non-convergent policies’ variety (e.g. Hall
1986; Scharpf 1991), which were inspired by the new institutionalism. Certainly,
the notion of institutional evolution as a discontinuous process is much older
than the New Institutionalism. See e.g. Schumpeter (1934) and Crozier (1964).
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Although the punctuated equilibrium model conveys important insights into
the dynamics of institutional development, it clearly doesn’t cover the whole
story. One wonders, for example, why episodes of crisis and drama do not occur
much more frequently. In contemporary societies cultural, technical, economic,
and political variables seem to be changing rapidly and turbulently, but cases
where institutions are ’stressed beyond their buffering capacity to resist and
absorb’ are rare on any account. Even violent changes in environmental condi-
tions do not usually result in institutional breakdown. If the punctuated equilib-
rium model applies only to such supreme events in history as the French or
the Russian Revolution, one should better look for a theory that explains what
happens in between – it is hard to believe that there is no institutional change
and adaptation going on in the interstices. On the other hand, how should
change and adaptation proceed in the presence of inertia? Are not inertia and
change mutually exclusive?
This paper hopes to show that there are forms of institutional change which
are compatible with inertia. It looks at two empirical examples, the international
regime for standard setting in telecommunications and the German health care
system, which both were adapted during more than 100 years of history to
varied and at times fundamental changes in environmental conditions without
any institutional break, switchover, or revolution.5 Adaptation was premised
on the preservation of institutional stock. Institutional structures, once estab-
lished, were not replaced but supplemented and extended by new structures
or used in new and innovative ways. Their structural context was enriched,
their functional references changed; they were patched up and transposed.
Institutional change by patching up and transposition6 is very common. Institu-
tional arrangements often display a strong tendency to gain in complexity over
time, and much of political and bureaucratic life consists of attempts to tackle
new problems by the creative use of old institutions. Nevertheless patching up
and transposition have largely been ignored in the new institutionalist litera-
ture, with the result that inertia has been identified with no-change. This paper
attempts to show that the relation between inertia and change is more nuanced.
5 The two cases are drawn from empirical research which was recently completed
at the Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, Köln. For the standard-
setting case see Schmidt/ Werle (1995) and Genschel (1995). For the health care
case see Rosewitz/ Webber (1990); Alber/ Bernardi-Schenkluhn (1992) and espe-
cially Döhler/ Manow-Borgwardt (1992).
6 The term ’transposition’ was adapted from Sewell (1992: 17-18).
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The ways in which institutions are changed and adapted reflect the ways in
which institutions resist change and channel adaptation. Hence, the paper starts
with a section on inertia (section 2). Why are institutions inert in the first place?
Three sources of institutional persistence are briefly reviewed: sunk costs, uncer-
tainty, and political conflict. Section 3 and 4 investigate ways of institutional
change which are compatible with inertia. Recounting the cases of the interna-
tional telecommunication regime and the German national health care system
respectively, they investigate how patching up and transposition work and why
they often take precedence over change by switchover. Section 5 concludes with
some general speculations on inertia, change and adaptation.
2 Three Sources of Institutional Inertia
The new institutionalist literature has dealt very thoroughly with the problem
of institutional inertia. It discusses a wide range of mechanisms which contrib-
ute to institutional persistence; therefore, I will not try to give a complete sur-
vey. Instead I concentrate on three very common, very simple, and, as I would
argue, very powerful sources of inertia: sunk costs, uncertainty, and political
conflict.
Sunk costs
Institutions cause large initial set-up costs. Actors have to learn rules, codes,
and conventions. They have to develop particular skills, competencies, and
tools, establish specialized personal contacts, and sometimes they even have
to set up extra physical infrastructures. All these assets take time, money and
effort to built up. Once they are in place, however, they can potentially be used
for a very long time. They represent a durable form of capital. However, this
capital tends to be institution-specific to some degree. It cannot easily be trans-
ferred. Infrastructures built to the specifications of one institution have to be
remodeled in order to fit the specifications of another. Institutional experience
gathered in one institution is worthless in the context of another. Codes which
apply in one institution don’t apply elsewhere, etc. The specificity of institution-
al capital makes a switch of institutions costly. The capital tied to an old institu-
tion cannot be shifted to the new institution and has to be written off; safe
returns are lost. The capital investment for the new institution has to start from
scratch. Fresh resources have to be spent, and it takes some time and transitory
confusion until the new institution is fully operative. Given these ’evils of tran-
sition’ it is often rational to stick to old institutions even after new and poten-
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tially better ones have become available (Stinchcombe 1968: 120-123; Scharpf
1987: 142-143).
Uncertainty
In a world of bounded rationality and limited attention, the knowledge about
institutional choices is necessarily incomplete. Often it is difficult to even con-
ceive of alternatives to the institutional status quo. But even if models of alter-
native institutions are available, their effects are much more difficult to predict
than the effects of given institutions. It is unclear how they will perform, when
they will be fully operative, and how they will affect the relative position of
different actors. All knowledge about them is secondhand or purely conjectural,
while the old institutions – with all their advantages and faults – are known
by experience. As a result, any changeover from an old to a new institution
involves an element of uncertainty and risk. If the stakes are high and there
is some risk aversion, actors may stick to their old institutions even if they sus-
pect that there are better alternatives (Heiner 1983; Shepsle 1986: 75).
Political conflict
Institutions often have a distributive bias which systematically makes it easier
for some actors to achieve their goals than for others. This potential for partiali-
ty makes a switch to new institutions prone to conflict. The beneficiaries of the
status quo have to be bought off or overpowered, and the proponents of a
switch have to agree on a common design. Actors have to mobilize followers,
forge coalitions, settle disputes, and hedge against strategic risk. All these ac-
tions are costly, time-consuming, and not necessarily successful – transaction
costs which are avoided unless actors believe that the advantages of a switch
are fairly substantial. They insulate institutions from dissatisfaction and provide
them with a measure of stability that they would never enjoy in a transaction
cost-free world (Machiavelli 1965: 33; Shepsle 1989: 144).
Sunk costs, uncertainty, and potential conflict put a premium on institutional
conservatism. They reduce the attractiveness of institutional alternatives and
thus act as a barrier against a switchover to new institutions. Over time these
barriers may grow so high as to make escape virtually impossible. The actors
become ’locked-in’ to their old institutions, compelled to reenact them over and
over again. Institutions turn into what Hegel called ’second nature’. Despite
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their man-made origin they are perceived as something that is exogenously
given and resistant to willful change (Offe 1992: 15-16).7
However, as the following case studies will show, this is not the end of the
story. Inertia does not restrain institutional change per se. Even if the costs and
risks involved in removing and replacing given structures are prohibitively
high, actors can still patch these structures up with new structures or transpose
them to new functions.
3 Patching Up the International Regime for Standard Setting
in Telecommunications
3.1 The Case
Until very recently telecommunications was a ’national’ technology. It was a
national technology in a political sense because it was tightly controlled by the
state. In some countries the state ran the telecommunication system itself
through a public Post, Telegraph and Telephone Administration (PTT); in
others, like the US, the system was private, but the state monitored, supervised,
and regulated its operation. Telecommunications was a national technology
in an organizational sense because its production and operation were arranged
on a strictly national basis. Both functions were supervised and managed by
the national PTT. It held a monopoly on networks and services and closely
controlled the work of a small circle of national equipment suppliers. Although
legally independent, the suppliers were closely tied to the PTT by a mixture
of relational contracts, ’buy national’ policies, and lack of export opportunities.
Finally, telecommunications was a national technology in a strictly technical
sense. Telecommunication networks were coextensive with national territories.
They ended at national borders and had distinctly national traits. Each was built
to national specifications so that equipment could not easily be ported from
one network to another. There was almost no trade in equipment (and none
at all in services) (Cowhey 1990; Schneider 1991).
7 Brian Arthur has modeled how actors who make choices in the presence of
positive feedback may become locked into one choice without any chance of
escape (Arthur 1988, 1989; see also David 1985). For a straightforward application
of this model to the issue of institutional persistence, see North (1990, Chap. 11).
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The only interaction between the self-contained national telecommunication
systems was through the conjoint provision of international services. PTTs had
to get together, hook up their networks at some international network intercon-
nection point and decide on the administrative, technical and legal rules of
cooperation. In principle each pair of countries could have got together on a
bilateral basis and agreed on a separate set of rules. But it was realized very
early on that the application of common rules would significantly reduce bar-
gaining costs and speed up the development of international telecommunica-
tions (Hutcheson Reid 1985).
The first major attempt at multilateral coordination was made in 1865. Delegates
from twenty European countries came together in Paris, drafted an ’Interna-
tional Telegraph Convention’, and set up an intergovernmental organization,
the ’International Telegraph Union’ (ITU),8 to periodically review the conven-
tion and adapt it in light of changing circumstances. Intergovernmentalism
seemed to be the appropriate framework since telecommunications was politics
even if it was low-politics, and for quite some time intergovernmentalism
worked rather well. However, once international telephony was introduced and
telecommunications became more complex and dynamic, some problems of
the intergovernmental approach began to show. Diplomatic conferences got
bogged down in technical and administrative detail. The complexities of inter-
governmental bargaining interfered with the swift adaptation of rules to the
evolving state of technology (Codding/ Rutkowski 1982).
Relief came from the outside. In the early 1920s six European PTTs established
a committee outside the framework of the ITU, the ’International Consultative
Committee on Long-Distance Telephony’ (CCITT),9 which was to advise the
PTTs on the development of international telephone connections. The commit-
tee’s charter was to study the technical, operational and tariff aspects of inter-
national connections and to issue standards for their regulation. These standards
were non-binding in a legal sense, so that most of the procedural safeguards
that dragged down decision processes within the ITU could be avoided. They
just provided focal solutions that the member administrations could comply
with voluntarily (Chapuis 1976).
8 In 1932 the name was changed to ’International Telecommunications Union’.
9 The original name was CCIF. Only after the committee was merged with its sister
’International Telegraph Consultative Committee’ (CCIT) in 1956 was it called
CCITT (International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee). In 1992
it was given yet another new name, the ITU Telecommunication Standardization
Sector (ITU-T). For sake of consistency, I will call it CCITT throughout the text.
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In 1925 the CCITT was absorbed into the ITU structure as a separate subdivi-
sion, relieving the ITU intergovernmental conferences from much of their work-
load. The conferences could concentrate on the provision of a legal framework
for international telecommunications and leave to the CCITT all the technical
and administrative details that had to be solved in order to make international
telecommunications actually happen. This division of labor worked rather well
until the 1970s when a series of technical and political changes set in which
eventually undermined the very basis on which the CCITT was operating:
Telecommunications converged with computer technology; the telecommunica-
tions industry was deregulated and liberalized (Cowhey 1990).
The compound effect of these changes was to subvert the central position of
the PTTs and to turn telecommunications into a transnational technology. The
PTTs lost their monopoly on network provision and service supply and increas-
ingly had to compete – on a more or less restricted basis – with private carriers
and service suppliers. Often they lost their public status as well, being privat-
ized and turned into regular business corporations. Finally, they lost control
over equipment supply. Due to the computerization of telecommunications,
R&D costs skyrocketed, causing a spate of cross-border mergers. Manufacturers
were forced to turn to the international market to increase sales. As a conse-
quence, the ties to the national PTT became loose. The industry became more
transnational in character. National regulations were supplanted by internation-
al rules, such as, for example, EU directives. Equipment production, network
operation, and service supply were increasingly arranged by multinational
actors. Networks grew to transnational dimensions. The technology, which used
to feature strong national peculiarities, became more alike across countries, but
more diverse across functions and proprietors. While, say, IBM networks basi-
cally look the same all over the globe, the differences compared to DEC net-
works are striking. The variety of services has increased manyfold (Genschel/
Werle 1993).
The CCITT’s institutional skeleton fitted the new environment badly:
– Its membership rule admitted only PTTs as full members, which was
sensible as long as the PTTs had full command over telecommunications.
Once the PTTs lost this command, however, the rule was too restrictive
and systematically excluded information, interests, and concerns which
were relevant for the successful standardization of telecommunications.
– The structural and procedural rules were modeled after the pattern of
intergovernmental organizations. The highest decision making organ was
a plenary assembly of the member countries (normally represented by
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their PTT), which met periodically every four years to pass standards and
to draw up the agenda for future standardization. Between the assembly
meetings, ’study groups’ of technical experts from the PTTs and, in an
advisory capacity, from industry and academia did the technical work.
Decision making required consensus. This set up worked fairly well as
long as standardization problems were few in number, easy to predict,
and technically well understood. It made the CCITT liable to friction,
delay, and uninformed decisions, however, once the new telecommunica-
tions environment generated ill-defined standard setting problems in great
quantities at short notice.
– The CCITT’s scope rules focused attention on the compatibility problems
which occur at the network interconnection points between national net-
works. However, in the new, more decentralized and transnationalized
environment, standards are needed not only to connect but also to consti-
tute networks, not only to coordinate ’nations’ but to coordinate ’organiza-
tions’ as well.
Since the 1970s the CCITT was under constant pressure to reform its basic
structure. However, reform proved to be difficult. The most obvious problem
was political. Opening the committee for new members implied a loss of power
for the old members, i.e. the PTTs. The PTTs used the CCITT as "a virtual tele-
phone cartel" (Cowhey 1990: 176) to reinforce their monopoly position and
consequently showed little interest to share it with actors like computer manu-
facturers, large user companies, or private service suppliers whose very objec-
tive it was to undermine the monopoly. Yet, as deregulation spread to more
and more countries, the common PTT front started to unravel. During the late
1980s, the prospects for reform improved and the organization made some
serious efforts to revamp its structure – with meager results. The names of
structures were changed, including the very name of the CCITT.10 Some new
structures were added, such as, for example, an advisory committee for strategic
planning.11 But basically the CCITT’s set-up remained unchanged. While this
caution was due in part to the reservations of some developing countries, the
more important factor behind it was that even the proponents of reform had
no design for radical measures. There were basically two reasons for this. One
was that the technological and regulatory changes which put the CCITT under
pressure were complex and confusing. It was obvious that the old CCITT struc-
ture no longer fit. But it was unclear what an ideal replacement structure
should look like. The old structure gave rise to a host of problems, but nobody
10 See footnote 9.
11 The Telecommunication Standardization Advisory Group (TSAG).
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had a grand vision of how to address them with one bold strike of reform.
Consequently the attention focused on removing bottlenecks rather than basic
flaws. The second reason was that the CCITT worked, even if not entirely satis-
factorily. It had established a good reputation among engineers. It had a pool
of thousands of people in different countries who had worked for it for years,
who knew the rules, and who knew how to apply them creatively (i.e. how
to cut through red tape). Reputation and reliability were valuable assets and
actors were hesitant to give them up lightly, especially since they were uncer-
tain if they could get anything better in return.
Despite all good reasons for not reforming the CCITT, the result was that cer-
tain critical standard setting functions remained undersupplied. As a conse-
quence, some actors tried to provide these functions on their own. Experimenta-
tion concentrated on two issue areas, computer communication and network
integration.
The development and application of computer communication was mainly
driven by the computer industry, not the traditional public telecommunication
establishment, represented on the CCITT. As a consequence, the CCITT was
fairly unresponsive to the demands of this new field. It lacked sensitivity for
the specific coordination problems involved, and it lacked the expertise to solve
them. The computer industry complained but also took action to offset this
neglect. Most importantly, it established a host of new standards organiza-
tions12 which were specifically designed to work on problem areas where
the CCITT could not or would not move. All of these moves were organized
decentrally by the actors immediately involved. There was no central coordina-
tion or control. However, mutual monitoring and imitation introduced a consid-
erable degree of uniformity. All these new organizations are rather close in set-
up and outlook. In general they are smaller than the CCITT, have private status,
work with less administrative overhead and hierarchy, and experiment with
new structural and procedural features such as project teams13 and contribu-
tion-dependent voting schemes.14
The problem in network integration was that by losing their monopoly on
network provision, the PTTs also lost their ability to guarantee the technical
coherence and integrity of the network infrastructure. Compatibility and fit
12 Examples include organizations as diverse as the American-based Corporation
for Open Systems (COS), the European Workshop for Open Systems (EWOS),
and the Internet Society (Isoc).
13 E.g. EWOS.
14 E.g. COS.
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which hitherto had been controlled hierarchically were suddenly at stake. One
obvious way to provide for these functions was by standards. While the CCITT
had the expertise to write these standards, it was hardly suited for the task.
The standards in question had to be compatible with the installed network base,
which, at least in its older parts, differed from country to country. Hence, differ-
ent standards were needed in different regions, and the CCITT being a global
organization seemed patently unfit to provide them. Rather than banking on
the CCITT to do the job, governments therefore called upon industry to set up
national or regional standards organizations. Out of this grew a new tier of
regionally based standards organizations. The most important are the T1 com-
mittee in North America,15 TTC in Japan,16 and ETSI in Europe17
(Hawkins 1992).
The proliferation of standards organizations caused considerable concern at
the CCITT. It seemed to mark obsolescence and impending insignificance
(Besen/ Farrell 1991). However, after the dust had settled it turned out that
the new organizations stabilized the CCITT rather than uprooting it. They spe-
cialized in making up for the CCITT’s particular ’inefficiencies’ and thus shield-
ed it from the potentially damaging consequences of its inability to remove
these deficiencies on its own. Their establishment worked as a functional substi-
tute for internal change and, hence, made internal change unnecessary. The
CCITT didn’t become obsolete. It just changed its function. From a monopoly
standards provider it mutated into an arena where decentralized standard set-
ting initiatives are coordinated and synchronized.
3.2 Discussion
The case of the international regime for standard setting in telecommunication
shows that adaptation is possible without institutional disruptions. When the
advent of international telephony threatened to overtax the ITU’s legalistic
mode of operation, a crisis was avoided not by changing the mode of operation
but by setting up a new additional structure, the CCITT, which relieved the
ITU of part of the burden. Likewise, when the dramatic technological and regu-
latory changes of the 1970s and 1980s put pressure on the CCITT, the pressure
15 American National Standards Institute Accredited Standards Committee for
Telecommunication - One.
16 Telecommunications Technology Committee.
17 European Telecommunications Standards Institute.
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was diverted not by changing the CCITT’s basic set-up, but by supplementing
the CCITT with new organizations which specialized in covering up its weak
spots. Adaptation was achieved by patching up.
The process of patching up displays some features of what Braybrooke and
Lindblom (1963) called the strategy of disjointed incrementalism. Most important-
ly, it was oriented remedially in the sense that it aimed at relieving specific
bottlenecks and deficiencies of the CCITT rather than trying to replace it. More-
over, patching up proceeded decentrally in that all initiatives to make up for
the deficiencies of the CCITT by establishing new organizations were organized
locally. There was no central coordination. However, why did patching up take
precedence over a switchover? Why was the CCITT supplemented by new
institutions rather than thoroughly reformed? The answer seems to be that
patching up was less costly, less risky, and less politically divisive.
Sunk costs
A switchover to a new institution (or a thoroughly revamped ’new CCITT’)
would have forced the actors to write off the investments which were tied to
the old CCITT structure. Patching up, by contrast, protected the sunken invest-
ments and thus reduced the transition costs of adaptation.
Even if it had been successful, a switchover from the CCITT to an entirely new
structure would have caused considerable transition problems. The replacement
of old structures causes noise and confusion and frustrates attempts at business
as usual. The actors have to gather new experience, develop new skills, and
acquire new tools before they can go back to normal. Therefore, a new standard
setting structure would have come at the price of a more or less extended pe-
riod of experimentation, improvisation and low performance (see Scharpf 1987:
142). Patching up reduced transition problems because it didn’t disrupt the
internal structures and processes in the CCITT. The CCITT continued to work
almost unperturbed while the patching up proceeded. Minor transition prob-
lems did occur because patching up diverted some attention and resources
away from the operation of the CCITT, but major disruptions in the production
of standards were avoided.
Uncertainty
Patching up the CCITT generated less uncertainty than a switchover to a new
institution. A switchover would have gambled all the safe achievements of the
CCITT for the uncertain benefits of a new institution. In the best of cases this
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could have resulted in a truly optimal institution. In the worst case it would
have resulted in a new arrangement even worse than the CCITT. Since the
actors were risk-averse, dreading the worst outcome more than they valued
the best, and since they lacked a theory on how to achieve the best outcome
without risking to end up with the worst, they were biased against a switch
(see Luhmann 1968).
Patching up was less radical. It didn’t remove the CCITT’s structural ills. It just
tried to compensate for them. Because it premised all changes on the continu-
ance of the CCITT, it promised less startling improvements. But it also risked
less damaging losses. It reduced the chances for optimal adaptation, but offered
the security that even in the worst case the new structural arrangement would
not do much worse than the CCITT on its own (see Braybrooke/ Lindblom
1963: 66-68; Heiner 1986: 237-242; Czada 1994: 254-255).
Political conflict
For two reasons, patching up the CCITT caused less political conflict than a
switchover to a new organization. First, patching up proceeded decentrally.
Actors who felt intensely about some specific deficit of the CCITT went ahead
and set up a new organization to ameliorate it. They didn’t have to wait for
everybody else to come along, which greatly reduced the bargaining problems
involved. Potential opponents didn’t have to be placated. They could just be
left out in the cold.
Second, patching up didn’t challenge the CCITT’s political foundations. The
creation of new additional standard organizations did not call into question
the claims and privileges which were granted under the CCITT structure. It
just established new claims. Certainly these claims were only partially compati-
ble with the claims embodied in the CCITT. But since they were lodged in
separate organizations, these incompatibilities were relatively easy to tolerate,
overlook, or gloss over. Latent conflicts largely remained latent. A switchover,
by contrast, tends to make latent conflicts virulent because it forces actors to
spell out their divergencies and accommodate them in one comprehensive
settlement. Patching up diffuses conflict by allowing for inconsistency.
Switchovers accentuate conflict by forcing consistency (see March 1994: 194-195).
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4 Transpositions in the German Health Care System
Section 3 has shown how inert structures can be adapted to new circumstances
by patching them up with additional structures. This section will show how
stable structures can be adapted to evolving conditions by transposing them
to new functions.
4.1 The Case
The Sickness Insurance Law of 188318 introduced compulsory health insurance
in Germany. It built upon a preexisting network of voluntary sickness funds,
and charged them with providing health care for their members. The terms on
which the funds were to cooperate with physicians for this purpose remained
unspecified, however. This left the funds free to fully exploit their near monop-
sony power in the market of health care services. The physicians were at a
disadvantage. With each of them acting on his own, their bargaining position
was weak. Their economic fortunes declined (Stone 1980: 44).
The balance of power tipped when the physicians started to unionize. After
the turn of the century a surge of physicians’ strikes undermined the sickness
funds’ dominant position and shattered the foundations of the health care
system. In 1913 the government stepped in. Public officials met with representa-
tives from both sides and mediated the so-called ’Berlin Agreement,’ which
established formalized procedures for bargaining and conflict resolution. Three
committees were set up on which physicians and sickness funds had equal
representation: an Admission Committee19 to supervise the admission of doc-
tors to fund practice, a Contract Committee20 to oversee contracting between
physicians and funds, and a Central Committee21 to deal with all conflicts
which couldn’t be settled by the other two committees.
The Berlin Agreement expired in 1923, while Germany was being hit by infla-
tion. The incomes of physicians suffered, the sickness funds’ revenues lost
value, and both sides tried to shift the burden of adjustment on to the other.
The prospects for a renewal of the agreement were bleak. Again the govern-
18 Krankenversicherungsgesetz.
19 Registerausschuss.
20 Vertragsausschuss.
21 Zentralausschuss.
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ment moved in to limit the damage. By emergency order it turned the voluntary
arrangements of the Berlin Agreement into law. The Central Committee was
now called the Imperial Committee of Physicians and Sickness Funds and took
on a compulsory character. The committee’s decisions were elevated to law-like
status and its scope was greatly expanded. While formerly responsible only
for the settlement of conflicts which arose in the course of implementing the
Berlin Agreement, it was now charged with reviewing, revising and refining
the agreement itself. From arbitration it was pushed into lawmaking.
It was mainly for two institutional reasons that the new Imperial Committee
did not succumb to the burden of its job. One reason was the participation of
government officials. The presence of the state as a third party made it possible
to break deadlock through coalition building. Since both physicians and sick-
ness funds wanted to keep the state out of their dealings, lest they should re-
linquish control to it, the premium on accommodation rose. The ’shadow’ of
the state civilized the conflict between both sides and rendered it more man-
ageable (see Scharpf 1993: 145). The other reason was that the committee mem-
bers were protected from pressure and reprimand. Participation in the commit-
tee was regarded as a public office. Participants were free of instructions. They
were treated as ’disinterested experts,’ obliged only to the commonweal of the
health care system. While certainly this legal fiction did not entirely drive out
factionalism, it nevertheless diluted it considerably. It forced actors to couch
their demands in universally acceptable arguments and thereby subtly softened
them. Discussions were framed as technical deliberation rather than political
bargaining. The ’de-politicization’ of the committee was made easier and more
plausible when it gradually extended its reach into the material regulation of
medical services by, for example, issuing guidelines on drug prescription, and
the use of ’electrophysical’ methods in medical therapy.
The Imperial Committee made important progress in regulating and pacifying
the relations between physicians and sickness funds. But, clearly, there were
limits to what it could do. When the depression of the early 1930s put the
sickness funds under heavy financial strain, the main physicians’ union intro-
duced a proposal which offered short-run financial self-restraint of fund doctors
in exchange for structural concessions of the sickness funds. Although hard
pressed financially, some funds declined the offer in view of its long-term
implications. Eventually, the government enforced the proposal by emergency
order (Webber 1988: 173-175). The emergency order of 1931 brought the evolu-
tion of the relationship between sickness funds and physicians to an end. It
codified the relationship in public law, molded it into a pattern that remains
to the present day, and settled the most controversial issues (Kirkman-Liff 1990).
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After the war, the health care system in West Germany was resurrected along
the old lines. The Imperial Committee was succeeded by a Federal Committee
of Physicians and Sickness Funds.22 Although the new committee did not in-
clude representatives from government – a reaction to the extensive government
involvement during the Nazi regime –, the state retained powerful controls.
All decisions of the Federal Committee require government approval, and in
case of deadlock the government can bypass the committee by decree. However,
since the emergency order of 1931 had removed most of the contentious issues
which had kept the Imperial Committee busy, there wasn’t much danger of
deadlock anyway. The Federal Committee didn’t have much to do and receded
to the background of the health care system (Döhler/ Manow-Borgwardt 1992:
582-583).
Only during the 1960s did the Federal Committee regain some of its former
standing. In the wake of liberal welfare legislation it was reactivated to give
technical guidance during the period of rapid expansion of mandatory sickness
fund benefits. For this purpose it issued guidelines on matters such as cancer
prevention, well-baby exams, or psychotherapy. The material regulation of
medical services, which used to be one of its subsidiary functions, became its
main occupation. The transformation from a political institution for conflict
resolution into an apolitical source of technical competency seemed finally
complete. While this transformation didn’t stir much excitement, it proved
important years later in the course of attempts to control health care costs.
Due to several reasons, health expenditures during the early 1970s increased
by almost 20 percent annually. The ’cost explosion’ of the health care system
became a topic of major public concern. As a first measure to curb the runaway
costs, the Federal Parliament passed a law in 1977 that introduced prospectively
negotiated ceilings on expenditures for physicians’ services and prescription
drugs.23 The definition of these ceilings was delegated to a newly formed
committee, the National Health Conference24 (Stone 1979).
While the inception of the National Health Conference was accompanied by
much publicity and high expectations, its performance turned out to be rather
disappointing. Ironically, it was precisely the fact that it was conceived for the
purpose of cost control which prevented the conference from effectively doing
so. First, it led to the inclusion of all actors who could claim to have a stake
22 Bundesausschuss der Ärzte und Krankenkassen.
23 Krankenversicherungs-Kostendämpfungsgesetz.
24 Konzertierte Aktion im Gesundheitswesen.
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in health care expenditures – physicians, sickness funds, hospitals, the pharma-
ceutical industry, pharmacists, local, state, and federal governments, trade
unions, employers’ associations. As a result the conference was large and un-
wieldy. More importantly, nobody was left outside the conference on whom
the costs of internal agreement could have been dumped. Second, it focused
attention on distributive issues. Everybody understood that the conference was
about cuts. Participants concentrated on avoiding individual loss rather than
the search for collectively beneficial solutions.25 In combination with the con-
ference’s inclusive composition and its decision rule of unanimity this often
resulted in deadlock. Third, cost containment drew high public attention. Since
the conference meetings were extensively covered in the press, participants used
them to publicize and defend claims rather than to negotiate and accommodate
them. All three factors combined turned the National Health Conference into
a highly visible but largely inconsequential institution.
Patching up the health care system with the new National Health Conference
was not the only reaction to the cost crisis. The government also reviewed the
set of existing institutions to see which of them could be used for cost control
purposes. The Federal Committee was ordered, among other things, to produce
a price list of equivalent drugs which physicians were to use to choose the
cheapest available drugs for prescription, and to draw up a list of ’bagatelle
medicines’ which would no longer be reimbursed by the sickness funds. Even
though the committee failed with respect to the latter, it turned out to be more
useful for cost control purposes than the National Health Conference. First, it
is much more exclusive. The number of participants is smaller and the chances
for externalizing the costs of agreement are larger. While in the Federal Com-
mittee physicians and sickness funds can conspire against, say, the pharmaceuti-
cal industry, they can’t in the National Health Conference, where the pharma-
ceutical industry itself is a member and has veto power. Second, the Federal
Committee deflects attention from distributive conflicts by framing all issues
as technical rather than economic problems. This does not mean that the actors
are unaware of the distributive implications of the committee’s decisions. But
since they can not refer to them directly, these implications tend to be less
divisive.26 Third, the Federal Committee grants its participants secrecy and
room for maneuver. Committee meetings are not open to the public. Committee
25 To use Scharpf’s terms, the set-up of the National Health Conference explicitly
for the purpose of cost control stimulated a ’bargaining’ orientation and stifled
the emergence of a ’problem-solving’ orientation (Scharpf 1989).
26 Characteristically, the Federal Committee in all its public statements talks about
’deliberations’ and ’decisions’ rather than ’bargaining’ and ’agreement’ (Döhler/
Manow-Borgwardt 1992: 585).
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members are free from instruction; their individual voting behavior is not regis-
tered in the proceedings. They are thus protected against supervision and repri-
mand, which increases both their options and incentives for cooperation and
accommodation.
By using the Federal Committee for cost control purposes, the government
learned about the Committee’s advantages and subsequently tried to make
more extensive use of them. The committee’s responsibilities were gradually
extended. The Health Reform Law27 of 1988 expanded its role in drug regula-
tion and gave it authority over the evaluation of the diagnostic and therapeutic
value of new methods of medical treatment. The Health System Law of 199228
established a new drug institute subordinate to the Federal Committee and
asked the committee to define standards of ’oversupply’ in office-based physi-
cians.
The ascent of the Federal Committee left a lot actors aggrieved, potentially
everybody who lacked representation in it. However, challenging the commit-
tee’s position proved difficult. Compared to the National Health Conference
it worked quickly, reliably, and effectively. Challenging something that works
is always difficult. Moreover, the framing of the committee as a body of techni-
cal expertise rather than interest representation protected it from demands to
open up. No other actor could claim the same degree of ’expertness’ and close-
ness to the patient as physicians and sickness funds. Finally, the privileges that
physicians and sickness funds gained from their exclusive hold over the com-
mittee gave them a strong incentive to preserve the status quo by making the
committee work. Thus, the same forces which may prevent changes for the
better prevented a change for the worse.
4.2 Discussion
The institutional history of the German health care system is in large part a
history of patching up. When the fabric of the national health care system was
threatened by the physicians’ strikes in the early 20th century, it was mended
with the Central Committee. When the same system was later in danger of
being overwhelmed by cost increases, it was patched up with the National
Health Conference. However, the case study conveys a second story as well.
The health care system was adapted to new contingencies not only by patching
27 Gesundheits-Reformgesetz.
28 Gesundheitsstrukturgesetz.
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up its old structures but also by using these structures in new and innovative
ways. The Central Committee was initially created to arbitrate conflicts which
arose in the specific context of the ’Berlin agreement’. But when the problems
and priorities in the health care system shifted, the committee in its successive
guises was put to very different uses. The Imperial Committee wrote regula-
tions for the conflict between sickness funds and physicians, the Federal Com-
mittee gave technical guidance to the expansion of mandatory health care bene-
fits and helped to control the inflation of health care costs. All these transposi-
tions were instrumental in adapting the health care system to new conditions
without changing its established structures.
The process of transposition was marked by ’backward looking’ and improvisa-
tion. In contrast to patching up and switching processes which ’look forward’
to solving new problems by creating new institutions, the transposition process-
es in the health care system started with retrospection. The actors turned back
to already existent institutions and tried to figure out how they could be used
to tackle whatever was the new problem at hand. The methodology of the
review was the analogy. New problems were likened to old problems, and the
institutions which worked on the old problems were reassigned to the new
ones: The problem of writing rules for the conflict between physicians and
sickness funds was likened to the problem of arbitrating it, and the competency
of the Central Committee, which had authority over arbitration, was extended
to include rule making. The task of giving technical guidance on the retrench-
ment of the health care system was likened to the task of giving technical guid-
ance on its expansion, and the Federal Committee which had been assigned
to the latter was reassigned to the former. In the course of these transpositions
the committee changed its character. Originally created as a specific tool for
a specific purpose, it gradually turned into a general operator for a large class
of problems.29 Somewhat surprisingly, this transformation was fuelled by the
same factors which also account for institutional persistence.
29 The process of transposition bears close resemblance with Lévi-Strauss’ concept
of bricolage (French for tinkering or puttering about). A bricoleur, according to
Lèvi-Strauss, is someone who is adept at performing a large number of diverse
tasks; but unlike the engineer, he does not subordinate each of them to the avail-
ability of raw materials and tools conceived and procured for the purpose of the
project. His universe of instruments is closed and the rules of his game are al-
ways to make do with ’whatever is at hand,’ that is to say with a set of tools
and materials which is always finite and is also heterogeneous because what it
contains bears no relation to the current project (Lèvi-Strauss 1966: 17; see also
Jacob 1977).
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Sunk costs
The strategy of transposition reuses the sunk costs of an old institution for a
new purpose. For example, the transposition of the Central Committee from
the task of arbitrating the implementation of the Berlin agreement to the task
of reviewing, revising, and refining the terms of this agreement reused the
assets built up for the former purpose in order to achieve the latter. Contacts,
reputations, precedents, procedures, and shared understandings which were
invested in the committee during arbitration were recycled for the purpose of
legislating new rules for the health care system. The most important advantage
of this recycling operation was that it allowed for a very quick response to the
new problem. During the crisis of 1923 the government was pressed for time
to find a workable solution for regulating the relationship between physicians
and sickness funds. Reassigning the Central Committee to that problem had
the advantage that the Central Committee was immediately available, while
other solutions involving the destruction of old or the build up of new institu-
tions would have taken time to become effective. Transposition has "economies
of time compression" (Levinthal/ March 1993: 102-103). It provides ’instant’
solutions to new problems (Majone 1991: 79; Czada 1994: 248).
Uncertainty
In general, actors are more certain about the future effects of institutions which
they know from experience than of institutions with which they don’t have any
experience. The strategy of transposition exploits the comparative certainty of
known institutions in order to reduce the uncertainties of adaptation. By at-
tacking new problems with known institutions, transposition avoids confound-
ing one uncertainty (about the quality and tractability of these problems) by
another (about the quality and reliability of the institutions dealing with them)
(see Nelson/ Winter 1982: 131). The German ministry of labor, for example,
which was in charge of the health care system throughout the 1980s, showed
a strong preference to assign cost-control related problems to the Federal Com-
mittee rather than to new specialized institutions. The bureaucrats knew that
the Federal Committee had produced workable (if not necessarily optimal)
solutions for a wide range of problems in the past, but they were uncertain
about the prospects of new institutions. While it was possible that new institu-
tions would eventually turn out to be better fitted for specific problems than
the Federal Committee, it was equally possible that they turn out to be failures.
Creating new institutions offered the chance of optimality. But transposing the
Federal Committee was the safer bet.
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Political conflict
The transposition of old institutions tends to depoliticize new problems. Assign-
ing the Federal Committee to the problem of cost control, for example, preempt-
ed a host of distributive conflicts. To be sure, the distributive consequences of
transposition were severe – physicians and sickness funds profited, other actors
were put at a disadvantage. But the discrimination didn’t stir much political
agitation. It was perceived as incidental to a legitimate attempt by the govern-
ment to cope with the cost crisis, not as the result of deliberate design.30 The
Federal Committee was an old and inert institution. It could either be used as
it was or not used at all. Major reconstruction with a view to changing its dis-
tributive bias was not a viable option. This forced the disadvantaged actors to
either fight the government’s decision to employ the committee altogether or
to endure their disadvantage. Since it was all but impossible politically to fight
something which seemed to be collectively beneficial on the grounds that it
was individually harmful, they chose the latter. Without much resistance they
accepted a degree of discrimination which they would never have accepted had
the Federal Committee been built from scratch and which, in fact, they did not
accept in the case of the National Health Conference.
The National Health Conference has a far less discriminatory structure than
the Federal Committee because it was built explicitly for the purpose of cost
control. With all design options open, even ’functional’ discrimination was hard
to justify and defend. As a result, the National Health Conference is a much
more equitable institution, but also a much less effective one. Conflict was
avoided at the price of endowing the conference with a structure, which made
it unfit for its purpose.31
30 "The idea is that resistance is provoked not by the state in which the citizens find
themselves, but by the causal process in which it originated. Social and economic
inequalities that result from the impersonal play of market forces are more ac-
ceptable than those that visibly stem from government discrimination" (Elster
1983: 90; see also Offe 1992: 24-25).
31 As Terry Moe has shown, it is very typical for conflicts which obstruct the cre-
ation of new institutions to be resolved at the price of decreasing the institution’s
efficiency and effectiveness (Moe 1990).
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5 Inertia, Change and Adaptation
Institutional change should not be contrasted with inertia in the new institution-
alist manner because inertia allows for and may even be a precondition of
institutional change. In closing some avenues for institutional transformation,
it opens others. It prevents radical breaks, switchovers and revolutions, but
allows for transposition and patching up. In preserving old institutional stock,
it provides the material for transposition and the building ground for patching
up. Granted that transposition and patching up are both possible under condi-
tions of inertia, when should we expect which mode of change to emerge?
Moreover, if institutional change can be achieved by exploiting inertia as well
as by breaking it, which way is better for adaptation?
Concerning the first question it is obvious that certain conditions favor one
mode at the expense of the other. If there are barriers to entry which prevent
the set up of new institutions, patching up is not available as an adjustment
strategy and actors will tend to fall back on transposition. If all institutions are
used to full capacity, there is no room for transposition and actors will have
to resort to patching up. If time is pressing, actors will try to make do with
whatever institution they already have. If there is a need to signal unambigu-
ously that a new problem is taken seriously, establishing a new institution –
rather than just reassigning an old one – has the advantage of high visibility.
Note, moreover, that patching up and transposition tend to stimulate each
other. Patching up supplies the requisite variety on which transposition works.
Transposition, in turn, generates demand for patching up because it exposes
institutions to problems which they were not designed to solve and therefore
often fail to solve completely. The former mechanism is exemplified by the
health system case where patching up – establishment of the Central Committee
– prepared the ground for transposition – reassignment of the Federal Commit-
tee to cost control issues. The latter, while not obvious in the case studies of
this article, can be observed in the process of German unification. Immediately
after unification in 1990, West Germany’s institutional set-up was transplanted
to East Germany. Exposed to unaccustomed circumstances, the set-up quickly
showed signs of strain and consequently was patched up with new structural
elements in a surge of what has been called ’repair legislation’ (Czada 1994).
Concerning the second question: It all depends on the peculiarities of the situa-
tion. Breaking with and exploiting of inertia both have their specific costs and
promises. There is no reason to assume that either is always better. Contrary
to new institutionalists’ preconceptions, their effects with respect to adaptation
are not governed by a simple step function, but by an array of trade-offs.
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Sunk costs and the trade-off between short-run and long-run benefits
Inertia is advantageous in the short run because it protects sunk costs and
mitigates transition problems. However, what is advantageous in the short run
is not always advantageous in the long run. The minimization of short-term
costs may preclude for the maximization of long-term returns. The avoidance
of disruptions in the near future may lock actors into developmental pathways
which lead into dead ends, and thus cause disruptions in the distant future.
Comfort now may be bought at the price of discomfort later. Yet a sacrifice of
stability wouldn’t solve the problem, but just transform it. A switchover to new
institutions may improve long-term prospects by opening up new developmen-
tal pathways, but only at the price of short-term disruptions and dislocations.
However, long-run benefits are valuable only if the actors survive all the short
runs along the way. Short-run survival, however, may require inertia (see Ar-
thur 1988: 13-14; Amburgey/ Kelly/ Barnett 1993: 53).32
Uncertainty and the trade-off between reliability and variability
Inertia prevents institutional changes from occurring which would involve
risking the loss of certain institutional achievements in order to gain uncertain
adaptive improvements. It premises institutional change on the protection of
existing structures and thus guarantees that the outcome will be in the neigh-
borhood of the status quo. It limits the variability of results. The advantage of
reduced variability is that it prevents radical deteriorations. The disadvantage
is that it prevents radical improvements. Sometimes reliability is more impor-
tant than variability, for example when the status quo is comfortable or when
an institution is non-redundant. At other times, however, variability may be
more important than reliability, for example when the status quo is troublesome
or when an institution is engaged in a competition for primacy with other
institutions (see March 1991; Tsebelis 1993: 7-8).
32 No society could sustain the transition costs of abandoning virtually all institu-
tions at once. As Douglass North has observed, the probably most conspicuous
feature of wars, revolutions, and other disruptions in institutional development
is that they are seldom as discontinuous as they appear on the surface (North
1990: 90; see also Krasner 1993). The actors need some stability in order to cope
with the costs and risks of change.
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Political conflict and the trade-off between conflict avoidance
and conflict intensity
Inertia makes adaptation less prone to conflict because it suppresses institution-
al change which upsets established political alignments. The spirit of old politi-
cal agreements can be modified, but hardly the letter. Incidental, incremental
changes of the political balance are possible, but deliberate and radical changes
are largely ruled out. Adaptive change is ’depoliticized’ and buffered from
political friction. Potential conflicts are ignored and avoided rather than recog-
nized and resolved (see Holmes 1988; Pierson 1993: 609-610). Sometimes unre-
solved conflicts simply fade away. The parties forget about them, or manage
to buy their opponents off by cooptation and indoctrination. At other times,
however, unresolved conflicts tend to get worse. They gather strength and gain
salience. When they are avoided, they become more intense and more difficult
to solve.
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